Abstract:
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The Honorable Court should reverse the decision of the State of Marshall Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Cyrus Country District Court because the courts erred in their failure to recognize a cognizable claim of intrusion upon seclusion. Appellee created an expectation of privacy grounded in the Terms of Use Agreement. Appellant’s affirmative steps to seclude his private affairs within Eden were consistent with an actual expectation of privacy. Because of these affirmative steps and the humiliation caused by the intrusion, it was highly offensive as defined in case law. Further, this Court has the opportunity to evolve the right to privacy, within the common law, to account for wrongs unique to the technology of today. Appellee is liable for the invasion of privacy under a contributing tortfeasor theory; but for the actions of Appellee, Appellant’s privacy would not have been intruded upon.
Also, the District Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for sanctions when Appellee destroyed crucial electronic evidence in bad faith. Moreover, Appellee’s refusal to comply with repeated requests and orders for discovery ruined Appellant’s ability to seek full judicial relief against LEETDUDE. The court should have either awarded default judgment or taken Appellee’s liability as established because those remedies were warranted under traditional sanctions analysis and for historically recognized reasons of specific deterrence, general deterrence and to prevent Appellee’s unjust enrichment. Moreover, the newly enacted MRCP 37 provides Appellee no refuse from sanctions because Appellee’s self-interested and bad faith spoliation does not reach sufficient merit to warrant protection under the rule and interpreting case law.
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